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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

over this

matter

pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The sole issue for the Court to determine is whether the
trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment
in favor of Appellees and ruling that Rhoda Thurber, as the sole
surviving co-settlor, co-trustee and active beneficiary, acted
within the lawful scope of her authority without breaching any
owed fiduciary duty by revoking the Trust established by
Declaration of Trust dated April 1, 1980.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Because entitlement to summary

judgment is a question of law, no deference is due the trial
court' s determination of the issues presented."

Higgins v. Salt

Lake County, 855 p.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
"If two or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust,
and if any of them is unable or refuses to accept the
appointment, or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee, the
1

surviving or remaining trustees shall perform the trust and
succeed to all the powers, duties, and discretionary authority
given to the trustees jointly." Section 75-7-405(2) of the Utah
Code.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case

This case is a dispute between the four named beneficiaries
of the Declaration of Trust executed by Joseph W. Thurber and
Rhoda Thurber on or about April 1, 1980.

The corpus of that

trust consisted of certain personal property identified within
the trust document and the residence owned by the co-settlors.
Subsequent to the execution of that trust, and following Joseph
Thurber' s death, Rhoda Thurber, as the sole surviving co-settlor,
joint trustee and active beneficiary unilaterally revoked the
trust of April 1, 1980 by testamentary device and by the sale of
the marital residence.

This case, therefore, centers on the

powers that a sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and active
beneficiary may exercise over a trust.
B.

Course of Proceedings

Appellants commenced this action on September 4, 1997 by
filing a Complaint in the Third District Court against Appellees.
Thereafter, on or about February 28, 1998, Appellants filed their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Appellees filed their

Motion in Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on or
about March 10, 1998.

On August 28, 1998, the parties argued

their respective motions before Judge Thorne.

Subsequent to this

hearing, on October 4, 1998, the trial court entered it Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees and denied Appellants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

On or about October 30, 199 8,

Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal.
C.
1.

Statement of Facts

On or about April 1, 1980, decedents Joseph W. Thurber

and Rhoda Thurber, as co-settlors, executed a revocable
Declaration of Trust naming themselves as joint trustees of the
Trust corpus which consisted of certain personal property
identified within the trust document and real property located at
2480 Alden Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Appellants' First
Addendum.
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the trust, the parties to this

action were named as contingent beneficiaries subject to
divestiture.
3.

Appellants' First Addendum, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4.

Pursuant to the terms of this trust, the decedents

reserved the right to revoke the trust, to encumber the trust
assets, or to collect any income derived from the trust assets
for their own use, thereby naming themselves as the primary
active beneficiaries of the trust.

No term of the trust document

prevents the decedents from completely exhausting the trust
corpus.

Appellants' First Addendum, paragraphs 2 and 3.

3

4.

Pursuant to the terms of the trust, "the sale or other

disposition by us of the whole or any part of the property shall
constitute as to such whole or part a revocation of this trust."
Appellants First Addendum, paragraph 3.
5.

Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the trust document, the

surviving co-trustee succeeds to all of the powers, as sole
trustee, exercisable by the joint trustees under the Declaration
of Trust.

Appellants' First Addendum, paragraph 5.

6.

Joseph Thurber predeceased Rhoda Thurber. (R.3).

7.

On or about December 16, 1985, Rhoda Thurber executed a

Last Will and Testament.

Pursuant to the terms of that

instrument, Ms. Thurber revoked all "testamentary instruments
which she had previously executed.
8.

On or about June 29, 1992, Ms. Thurber executed a

subsequent Last Will and Testament.

Pursuant to the terms of

that document, Ms. Thurber revoked all other former "wills and
codicils" which she had previously executed.

At this time Ms.

Thurber executed a second trust.
9.

On or about August 15, 1992, Ms. Thurber conveyed the

real property in question to Holli and Robert Bezzant in exchange
for monthly payments of $612.00 until the balance of the purchase
price was paid in full.
10.

Ms. Thurber is now deceased.
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11.

Pursuant to the terms of the testamentary instruments

executed subsequent to the 1980 Declaration of Trust, Appellees
have received the proceeds from the property in question.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to the explicit terms of the Trust document and
applicable law, decedents as co-settlors established themselves
as joint trustees and sole active beneficiaries of the trust
corpus.

As such, settlors retained the right to revoke the trust

and, as joint trustees, to encumber or otherwise utilize the
trust assets for their primary benefit.

Accordingly, although

named as beneficiaries under the document, the actual rights of
the decedents' children under the document could not be
ascertained until the death of both co-settlors.

As such, these

children are only contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture
and owed no fiduciary duty by either joint trustee.

When Ms.

Thurber, as the sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and
active beneficiary acted to revoke the trust, she did so under
the explicit authorization of the Trust document, and inasmuch as
Appellants have no claim under the subsequent testamentary
documents executed by Ms. Thurber, Appellants have no claim to
the property in question.

5

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ."

West One

Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah App. 1993).

All

of the relevant facts, as set forth above, were presented to the
trial court which properly concluded that the terms of the trust
permitted Ms. Thurber to revoke the trust following her husband' s
death.

However, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of

summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court even
if it is one not relied on below."

Hiqgins v. Salt Lake County,

855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
II. INASMUCH AS MS. THURBER PROPERLY REVOKED THE 1980
TRUST, APPELLANTS MAY NOT BASE ANY CLAIM TO PROPERTY ON THE
1980 DECLARATION OF TRUST.
Appellants' interest to the property in question stems
solely from the 1980 Declaration of Trust.

It is undisputed and

Appellants do not argue, that subsequent to Joseph Thurber' s
death, Rhoda Thurber as the sole surviving co-settlor and joint
trustee acted to revoke this trust.

The sole question before the

Court is whether the statement within the Trust document which
prevented a sole surviving co-settlor from changing the named
beneficiaries also prevented the revocation of the trust itself.
When viewed within the context of the entire trust document, it

6

becomes apparent, as the trial court rightfully concluded, that
it does not.
A. The trust clearly establishes that the decedents, rather
than the named beneficiaries, were the sole active
beneficiaries under the trust.
" [T]rust provisions are not to be construed in the abstract,
but rather must be viewed against the background of the
document."

entire

Brenneman v. Bennett, 420 F.2d 19, 23 (8th Cir. 1970)

(applying Iowa law) (emphasis added); accord Rubinson v.
Rubinson, 620 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (111. App. 1993).

Applying this

axiomatic rule of construction to the instant case leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the 1980 Trust document did not
prevent Rhoda Thurber from revoking the trust following her
husband1 s death notwithstanding trust language which prevented
Ms. Thurber from changing the beneficiaries within the existing
trust.
Viewed as a whole it is apparent that the 1980 trust served
primarily as a testamentary device designed primarily to avoid
the entanglements often associated with the probate process.

As

such under the explicit terms of the trust, the Thurbers, as cosettlors, reserved and retained extensive and broad powers under
the trust, not only to revoke the trust itself, but to utilize
the trust corpus for their own benefit while they were still
living.

Accordingly, paragraph 2 of the document states

unequivocally: "We reserve unto ourselves the power and right to
7

(a) place a mortgage or other lien upon the property, and (b) to
collect any rental or other income which may accrue from the
trust property and, in our sole discretion as Trustees, either to
accumulate such income as an addition to the trust assets being
held hereunder or pay such income to ourselves as individuals." Moreover, paragraph 3 explicitly authorizes the sale of the trust
corpus and states that such sale serves as a revocation of the
trust: "The sale or other disposition by us of the whole or any
part of the property shall constitute as to such whole or part a
revocation of this trust."

From this language it is clear that

the Thurbers in no way intended, by execution of the 1980
document, to limit their control over the trust corpus.

Rather,

they explicitly retained every right which they possessed prior
to such execution.

As such, the Thurbers, rather than the named

beneficiaries, stood as the sole active

beneficiaries under the

terms of the 1980 trust.
B. The death of Joseph Thurber in no way impaired Ms.
Thurber' s right to continue exercising broad powers over the
trust corpus for her primary benefit while she continued to
live.
Contrary to assertions advanced by Appellants, no trust
provision serves to limit Ms. Thurber' s status as the sole active
beneficiary following her husband's death.

Rather, Ms. Thurber

succeeded to all the benefits she enjoyed prior to her husband' s
death.

As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Matter of Estate of
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West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), "It defies common sense that a
couple creating a revocable inter vivos trust naming themselves
as trustees would deliberately preclude themselves from fully
utilizing the property for their own benefit while both or either
one of them was alive, particularly when it appears that the
purpose of the form book trust may have been simply to avoid
probate."
Moreover, in addition to succeeding to full beneficial
status, Ms. Thurber succeeded to full legal status as well.
Paragraph 5, reflecting section 75-7-402(2) of the Utah Code,
explicitly states: "Upon the death or legal capacity of one of
us, the survivor shall continue as sole Trustee."

As such, any

act which may have been lawfully exercised by the joint trustees
prior to Mr. Thurber' s death, could now be exercised by Ms.
Thurber unilaterally.

As discussed above, since the trust

granted the joint trustees broad powers to either sell or
encumber the trust property, following Mr. Thurber' s death, Ms.
Thurber retained this power solely without limitation and
rightfully exercised this power in 1992 when she conveyed the
trust realty.
C. Any limitation imposed by the trust addendum applies
only to powers related to the co-settlors and not to powers
exercisable by a trustee.
Appellants' argument that the trust addendum which provides
that following the death of one of the co-settlors that the
9

beneficiaries cannot be changed has no bearing on whether a sole
surviving trustee can convey realty and thereby terminate the
trust with respect to that realty; the sale of trust property is
a power exercisable only by a trustee while the naming of
beneficiaries is a right solely exercisable by a settlor.
Imposing a limitation on a sole surviving co-settlor with respect
to naming beneficiaries in no way affects specific and explicit
authority delegated to a trustee elsewhere within the trust,
namely the right to sell or encumber trust property for the
benefit of the sole surviving active beneficiary.

Moreover, this

limitation on the surviving co-settlor in no way impacts the
consequences of the sale or other disposition of trust property.
The trust explicitly states that such sale automatically revokes
the trust with respect to that specific property.
D. When viewed as whole, it is apparent that the trust
document imposes no limitation on a surviving trustee to
manage the property for the benefit of the sole surviving
active beneficiary.
When read in its entirety, it is apparent that the 1980
document stands primarily as a testamentary device.

As such the

Thurbers as settlors, granted themselves extensive authority,

as

trustees, to manage the property for their own benefit, as
primary active beneficiaries, while either one of them continued
to live.

Taken within this context, Ms. Thurber acted within her

authority when she conveyed the property in 1992.
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And, inasmuch

as this sale served to revoke the trust with respect to this
property, Appellants may not claim any interest in the proceeds
derived from this property.
III. APPELLANTS ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THIS CASE FROM WEST
IS MISGUIDED.
In Appellants' Brief, Appellants acknowledge that the Utah
Supreme Court' s recent decision in Matter of Estate of West, 948
P.2d 351 (Utah 1997) bears heavily on the current matter.

In

that case, the court found that a sole trustee who is also the
sole active beneficiary of the trust could rightfully terminate
the trust pursuant to the specific authorization granted in the
trust document.

In dicta, the Court also noted that Herschel

West could have revoked the trust as a surviving co-settlor.

Id.

At 354.
In determining that Herschel West acted within his authority
to terminate the trust as a surviving co-trustee, the Court
followed a three prong analysis.

First, the Court looked to

determine whether the trust document authorized the trustees to
revoke the trust.

Second, the Court looked to determine whether

a surviving co-trustee succeeded to all of the powers held by the
joint trustees.

Third, the Court looked to determine if a

trustee' s revocation of the trust violated any fiduciary duty
owed to the named beneficiaries.

11

Id. at 353-54.

After determining that the trust document specifically
authorized a trustee to revoke the trust and that a surviving
trustee succeeded to all of the powers held by the joint
trustees, the Court found that Herschel West did not violate any
fiduciary duty.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court made a

distinction between active and contingent beneficiaries.

"The

active beneficiaries of a trust, as distinct from the contingent
beneficiaries, are the individuals for whose benefit and support
the property is presently being managed."

.Id. at 355.

By this

definition, the Court readily accepted that the settlor/trustee
in that revocable trust setting constituted the active
beneficiary.

Evidence of that intent was found in the fact that

the settlor/trustee retained exclusive control to manage the
property as he saw fit without distributing any income to a named
beneficiary.
Finally, the Court noted that the trust property would not
be distributed until the death of the surviving trustee at which
time the trust corpus may have been exhausted.

Since the

children' s rights did not ripen until the death of the surviving
settlor/trustee, the children' s were subject to divestiture until
that time.

Thus, the Court found that Herschel West was the sole

active beneficiary of the trust, and as such, Herschel West could
terminate the trust as a trustee without violating any fiduciary
duty to a named beneficiary.
12

In the present case, the same three pronged analysis
employed by the Utah Supreme Court in West, indicates that Rhoda
Thurber acted within her authority to terminate the trust.
First, the trust document specifically authorizes the settlor or
the trustee to revoke or terminate the trust.
the trust document.

See Paragraph 3 of

Second, Rhoda Thurber, as surviving trustee,

succeeded to all of the authority held by the joint trustees.
See Paragraph 5 of the trust document, Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-7405(2) and West, supra.

Third, as the sole active beneficiary of

the trust, Rhoda Thurber, as trustee, violated no fiduciary duty
by terminating the trust.
Appellants apparently concede that the present case meets
the first prong of the analysis.

Appellants however, contend

that each of the named beneficiaries became active beneficiaries
at the trust's inception and that Ms. Thurber did not succeed to
all authority exercisable by the joint trustees.

Appellants base

this distinction on differences which they claim that exist in
the language of the two trust document.

A plain reading of the

two documents indicates that this distinction does not affect the
operation of the two documents.
A, No language in the trust document prevents Ms. Thurber
from succeeding to all powers held by both joint trustees.
As addressed above, Appellants' contention that the trust
addendum prevented Ms. Thurber from succeeding to all powers held
13

by both joint trustees is unfounded.

First, paragraph 5

explicitly states that the surviving trustee does in fact succeed
to all authority held by both joint trustees.

Second, inasmuch

as no section of the trust ever authorized the joint trustees to
change beneficiaries, Ms. Thurber as sole surviving trustee could
never exercise this right and the addendum therefore places no
limitation on powers exercisable by a trustee.

Rather, any %

limitation imposed by the addendum simply limits authority
exercisable by a surviving co-settlor, and inasmuch as a cosettlor never had any authority to sell property this addendum
does not address any issue before the Court today; whether a sole
surviving co-trustee succeeds to all powers properly exercisable
by joint trustees.
B. The children' s rights under the trust did not become
vested until the death of the final settlor/trustee. Until
that time the children were owed no fiduciary duty.
In their brief, Appellants quote the language from the
respective trust documents which they feel distinguishes West
from the present case.

Appellants emphasize that the Thurber

document does not contain the statement "on the death of the
survivor of us" which exists in the West document in the
paragraph before the contingent beneficiaries are named.

From

this distinction, Appellants state: "In short in West 'the trust
instrument was clear that the children would not become
beneficiaries until the death of the survivor of the two

14

settlors.'

Conversely, in the case at bar the trust instrument

is clear that Plaintiffs became beneficiaries on the date of its
execution, April 1, 1980."

Appellants' Brief, p. 9.

Appellants' distinction has two serious flaws: one textual
and one rational.

The textual flaw lies in Appellants' assertion

that the Thurber trust lacks the phrase, "on the death of the
survivor of us," in the granting language.

This is not true.

The very next sentence of the trust following the named
beneficiaries begins "Upon the death of the survivor of us,...our
Successor Trustee is hereby directed forthwith to transfer said
property and all right, title and interest to the beneficiaries."
Thus, the textual distinction simply does not exist.
The rational flaw lies in Appellants' failure to follow the
West Court' s rationale in designating the named beneficiaries as
contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture.

Appellees do

not dispute that Appellants became beneficiaries on April 1,
1980.

Appellees only argue that until the death of Ms. Thurber,

the parties were only contingent beneficiaries subject to
divestiture.

Appellants have ignored the West analysis entirely.

Since Ms. Thurber retained the right to receive income and manage
the trust property for her own benefit and terminate the trust at
her will, the possibility existed that Ms. Thurber could
completely exhaust the trust corpus notwithstanding her right to
revoke the trust.

Therefore, Ms. Thurber remained the sole
15

active beneficiary under the trust.

Appellants' , and indeed

Appellees' , rights under the trust did not vest until Ms. Thurber
died.

Before that time, both parties' rights were wholly subject

to divestiture and indeed, when Ms. Thurber acted to revoke the
trust, all parties lost their status as benficiaries under that
trust. As the sole active beneficiary and the sole trustee, Ms.
Thurber did not violate any fiduciary duty by terminating the
trust and extinguishing Plaintiffs' rights under the trust.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellees respectfully request this
Court to affirm the trial court' s ruling and find that pursuant
to the explicit terms of the Trust document and applicable law,
decedents as co-settlors established themselves as joint trustees
and sole active beneficiaries of the trust corpus.

As such,

settlors retained the right to revoke the trust and, as joint
trustees, to encumber or otherwise utilize the trust assets for
their primary benefit.

Accordingly, although named as

beneficiaries under the document, the actual rights of the
decedents' children under the document could not be ascertained
until the death of both co-settlors.

As such, these children are

only contingent beneficiaries subject to divestiture and owed no
fiduciary duty by either joint trustee.

When Ms. Thurber, as the

sole surviving co-settlor, joint trustee and active beneficiary
acted to revoke the trust, she did so under the explicit
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authorization of the Trust document, and inasmuch as Appellants
have no claim under the subsequent testamentary documents
executed by Ms. Thurber, Appellants have no claim to the property
in question.
ADDENDUM
^

No addendum is necessary.
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